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GETTIING
THE LAW SCHOOL
DOWN TO WHERE
THE WORLD IS
Legal education in the United States today, at least
when judged by outward manifestations, is the healthiest it has ever been. There are more schools with
more resources, larger and better faculties, and more
and better students. Yet inwardly legal education, like
America itself, is puzzled and uncertain about its
present and its future.
What are the attributes of a good lawyer? How
should a curriculum be structured to teach those
attributes that are best taught in an educational
setting, as distinguished from the apprenticeship
experience of the initial years of legal employment?
And to what extent should the law school be a
research institution producing new knowledge about
law and legal institutions, as distinct from a professional school that is vocationally oriented?
These questions bring to light two current trends in
legal education-its outreach toward the university
and toward the profession. In the past, law schools,
even if part of a university, were isolated from their
academic counterparts almost as if a moat
surrounded the law school. The law school was apart,
its curriculum was self-contained and its students
had little to do with students elsewhere in the university. The faculty's contact with colleagues in other
units was generally limited to social contact in the
faculty club or the swimming pool. Indeed, legal
education was often premised on the notion that "you

should forget everything you learned before you came
here; we're starting from scratch."
This isolation of the law school from the rest of the
university has been breaking down gradually for
many years, in some schools earlier and more extensively than in others. The desirability of this movement toward other branches of the university should
be readily apparent.
Law is not an isolated discipline but a practical art
that connects with every field of human endeavor.
Because it deals with everything that mankind does as
an organized society, it necessarily embraces
philosophy, history, economics, psychology and technology.
The law graduate today needs a solid foundation in
fundamental skills of legal analysis and legal reasoning. Basic information about legal institutions and
concepts-a substantive and procedural map of the
legal universe-is also essential. In addition, the law
graduate should be an intellectually curious person
who has a broad perspective on the possibilities and
limits of human life in organized communities.
Legal education should nurture the capacity to learn
on one's own and to deal confidently with other professionals who advance claims of expertise in the
solution of social problems. In dealing with issues at
the knife-edge of social change, the well-educated law
graduate should be assisted by knowledge of, and
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ability to utilize, the shared values and wisdom of
mankind's humanistic tradition.
The world is complex, and broad training is necessary to deal with its complexities. Lawyers today,
whether engaged in solo practice in small communities or in large private or public offices, need to understand the operation of bureaucratic institutions,
modern techniques of amassing and using data and
the various methods of problem solving and dispute
resolution. Dealing with government regulators,
handling expert witnesses, negotiating in the corridors
of power-these skills are central to the work of the
modern lawyer, who must also be prepared for the
more traditional arts of drafting wills, contracts and
deeds.
Education neither begins nor ends at law school. It
builds on what came before and, if done well on solid
ground, results in persons capable of educating
themselves during their ensuing professional
careers-persons whose vigorous intellects can imaginatively adapt the wisdom and practice of the past to
areas and problems that today can be only dimly foreseen.
OUTREACH TOWARD THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Legal education is becoming more intellectual; it is
also becoming more practical. It is reaching out more
and more toward the legal profession. When I reflect
on my own legal education only twenty years ago, I am
amazed at how divorced it was from what lawyers do
in counseling, negotiating, drafting and trying cases.
The actual operation of legal institutions other than
appellate courts, especially the Supreme Court of the
United States, rarely intruded into a curriculum that
was largely abstract, doctrinal and theoretical.
While the law curriculum still stresses powers of
analysis and continues to teach basic theory and
concepts, it reflects increasing concern on the part of
law teachers with "law in action"-the development
and imparting of new knowledge by comparing the
day-to-day operation of legal institutions with their
theoretical role. This development, coupled with the
growth of clinical legal education discussed below, has
enriched the law curriculum immensely.
Law schools now place far more emphasis than in
the past on skills other than those of case analysis.
Fact gathering, drafting, interviewing, counseling
and litigating have been incorporated into the curriculum, and greater efforts are made to put knowledge to
work, that is, to make it operational. It is one thing,
for example, to recite a subtlety of the hearsay rule
and quite another to recognize its application in the
hurly-burly of a trial and to make a proper objection.
True understanding of any art or craft requires not
only theoretical knowledge but also the ability to put
ideas to work in a professional context. This outreach
to the profession in the form of a broader conception
of the skills, information and attitudes that should be
taught in law school also has the effect of giving
dimension, life and reality to issues of professional
responsibility. These enjoy greater prominence in
legal education than ever before.
This article is based on Dean Cranton's 1974-75 Annual Report.

THE CASE METHOD REMAINS
The basic technique of legal education has proved
remarkably durable. The case method of instruction,
usually in a "Socratic" question-and-answer format
with a large class, has dominated law teaching since
Langdell pioneered it nearly a century ago. The
reasons for the longevity and popularity of the case
method are several: its pedagogical effectiveness,
particularly in comparison to lectures; its usefulness
even in large classes, and thus its low cost; and,
perhaps most important, its adaptability to differing
intellectual currents and differing conceptions of the
law.
Recent emphasis on the lawyer's diverse roles,
however, is leading to a major change. Many law
teachers are now seeking to train students in skills
other than those involved in case analysis. Most
schools are providing "role experiences" in clinical
programs or simulated practice situations, forms of
training designed to develop capabilities other than
case analysis. Two of the most important concepts in
current thinking about the law curriculum arise out of
emphasis on broad-ranging skills training and on
adaption to different professional roles.
The case method of instruction, originally conceived
as "clinical" because it exposed students to the "living
law" rather than abstract theory, is facing a challenge
today from clinical methods of instruction. This
revival and improvement of ancient methods of
training lawyers in the law office now offers legal
education the opportunity to achieve a more perfect
balance between practicing skills and analyzing cases.
The educational transition from law student to
lawyer should encompass not only required skills and
substantive knowledge but also the more complex
dimensions of emotional reaction, ethical behavior
and leadership capabilities. Today we have
provocative but inconclusive findings suggesting that
the law schools are doing an incomplete job of
preparing prospective lawyers. Some recent law
graduates report a kind of "reality shock" on entering
practice, which presumably reflects a gap between
their formal education and the demands of actual law
practice.
The formal and analytical training of law school has
not prepared them for important aspects of the roles a
lawyer must perform, and their self-image suffers as
they are forced to confront their own ignorance and
confusion before clients, employers and friends.
Clinical education offers opportunities to overcome
these deficiencies.
IS CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION NEEDED?
A number of objections are commonly voiced about
clinical legal education. One is that participation in
the handling of cases teaches only skills or knowledge
that can be easily and efficiently acquired during the
early years of practice.
Sometimes this argument takes the form of denigrating the value or intellectual substance of the skills
and knowledge involved; on other occasions it is a
more sophisticated argument that the limited
resources of law school are best employed in
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imparting skills and knowledge that cannot be easily
acquired during the apprenticeship years. No effort is
usually made to consider the nature and adequacy of
apprenticeship experiences to which law graduates are
now exposed, and arguments of this character are
often premised on caricatures of clinical training
(e.g., learning on whom to serve papers and where the
courthouse is).
A second objection to clinical education is that it
diverts educational resources to ideological and social
purposes. There is a fear that the clinical program will
have a bias because its clients normally are drawn
from one segment of society-the poor-and that the
service objectives will conflict with educational goals.
While there are problems in clinical programs that are
limited to the provision of legal aid in civil cases to
indigents and are manned by zealots, these limitations
are neither necessary nor inherent.
Moreover, the service function of a clinical program
need not be in conflict with the educational mission. A
private law school should not engage in a clinical
program for the purpose of providing service to
indigents; that is a diversion of limited educational
resources to improper purposes. But the fact that
service is incidentally provided by a program designed
to serve educational objectives is a plus rather than a
minus. Thus I believe that the justification for clinical
education must be made on educational grounds.
A third objection to clinical education is that it may
displace or interfere with traditional instruction in
large classes or small seminars by siphoning off
students or limiting the number of traditional courses
to which a student will be exposed. Given the limitations on coverage that now exist and the modest level
of student interest and involvement in some secondand third-year courses, this objection is not
persuasive.
We do not prevent students from concentrating
their course elections in a particular area, even if that
means a tendency toward "perspective" rather than
"bread and butter" courses, or vice versa. But wholly
apart from these difficulties, the traditionalism of law
students and their often overzealous desire to be
prepared on bar examination subjects are likely to
assure that basic courses are well attended.
A fourth objection to clinical education is its cost,
which is said to be much greater than traditional
methods of instruction. On this point the recent work
of Peter Swords of Columbia is persuasive. Swords
demonstrates that, although clinical education is
more expensive than large-class, "Socratic" teaching,
its costs are roughly equivalent to the small-seminar
instruction heavily featured during the second and
third years at the better law schools.
He concludes that any school that can afford a
seminar program can afford a clinical program and
that the choices must be made on educational rather
than economic grounds. I fully agree, although the
problem with any new program is that it must
compete for new resources since existing faculty and
staff can only rarely be redeployed to new fields or
methods of instruction.
A fifth objection to clinical education, and the one I

think is the most serious, rests upon a doubt that it
contains a sufficient intellectual component.
Individual cases may present difficult and challenging
problems, particularly when they have the novelty and
freshness of the young lawyer's initial case; but is
there a sufficient opportunity to generalize on these
experiences and to develop an understanding and
mastery of knowledge, skills and competencies that
are vital to a lawyer's training (and best taught in law
school rather than during the initial years of
practice)?
There is great force to the view that learning by
doing reinforces and motivates other forms of
learning. An imaginative and skillful clinical teacher
in a major law school should not be viewed as a
technician or a nuts-and-bolts person but as an
intellectual who can distill and synthesize experience
into concepts, theories and new knowledge.
The affirmative case for clinical education rests in
large part on the interest, excitement and power of
learning that involves the student's emotions and
requires that the student make knowledge
operational. It is one thing to have a cognitive
perception of an idea and quite another to put it to
work. And the excitement that future professionals
get out of putting themselves in a professional roleafter all, that is why they came to law school-not only
advances understanding of that professional role, and
thus acculturation as a lawyer, but stimulates
self-teaching that may spread to other courses in the
curriculum.
We are all familiar with the "walking wounded" of
law school-highly qualified students who put their
utmost effort into the competitive struggle of the first
year and "fail" in their own eyes because they did not
achieve high grades or law review, who are bored or
alienated by the repetition and lack of challenge of
some large-class instruction, and whose minds and
energies are never again engaged as they drift through
the remainder of law school.
A good clinical program offers the possibility of
reinvigorating the intellectual involvement in law
school of such students; to the extent that it does so, it
is an invaluable addition to the law curriculum.
Clinical education, in the broad sense used here,
encompasses not only new types of skills training but
such old ones as trial advocacy courses, moot court,
and law review research and writing experiences.
A MODEL CLINICAL PROGRAM
What would a model clinical program look like? I
suggest, with great tentativeness, the following
principles and structure. Clinical legal education
must be highly structured, well supervised, and
integrated with the rest of the law curriculum. I do not
envision clinical education as an add-on that comes
late in a student's law school experience, has little
relation to the majority of the student's work, and is
taught by individuals without qualifications sufficient
for regular faculty appointments.
Indeed, it is my belief that the development and
evolution of clinical teaching, with its opportunities
(Pleaseturn to page 59)
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Nevertheless, even armed with accreditation reports
demonstrating great need, legal educators may be
reluctant to engage in lobbying efforts. Many
academics seem to view lobbying as a rather vulgar
occupation. And there is the presumption among
faculty members (voiced frequently enough in this
magazine) that law professors know what is best for
legal education; there is a certain amount of disdain for
practitioners and others who presume to criticize law
school education; and the implication often is that
professors ought to be approached for consultation,
not expected to go out to present their case.
Such attitudes are dangerous and have to be overcome. Lobbying is, after all, an organized form of
expressing public needs to legislators; rightly conducted, it is effective, necessary and proper.
And law faculty and administrators must recognize
that they are not the only persons who feel they should
have a say in the operation of legal education-and
who have a legitimate interest in what happens in law
schools. Judges, practitioners and organized bar

groups are making greater demands on legal
education. Consumer groups want a voice in how
lawyers are trained. Students have opinions and ideas,
some of which get listened to and implemented.
It is clear that legal education is no longer (if it ever
was) the private reserve of the law professors. Now,
faced with growing demands and responsibilities, it is
high time for legal educators to act in their own selfinterest as well as with a large measure of considered
altruism on behalf of the bar and the public. They are
in a unique position to guide the future of legal education. To fail to do so means certain isolation from the
outside forces that already wield influence over the law
schools and who use public persuasion-and lobbying-as major tools.
The danger of inertia is that law schools may
jeopardize their autonomy. They may be taken over
and dictated to by those forces that see themselves as
also having a stake in law school education-and
whose only advantage over professional legal educators
is that they were motivated enough to act.
IL

ALL ISEXCUSED
(Continuedfrom page 21)
our time seem to be running toward a no-fault
guilt-free society. One might say the virtues of
responsible choice, paying the penalty, taking the
consequences all appear at low ebb today.
On the rising tide are the claims of the amnesty outlook and the pardonable offenders. Having witnessed
myself the special treatment of public figures like
Richard M. Nixon, John N. Mitchell, Lieut. William
L. Calley Jr. and numerous unindicted Watergate coconspirators, I can understand-although scarcely
condone-my students' reaction to the guilty leaders
of an earlier time.
Do I overinterpret when I surmise that they were
only reading into their understanding of Nazi
Germany some of their own current preoccupations,

cynicisms, fatalisms? At any rate I believe now my
course became for some students a kind of projection
screen for their own moral struggles and dilemmas.
Some day soon I'll be teaching the same course
again. But not in the same way. Next time I hope to
stress more strongly my own belief in the
contingencies, the open-endedness of history.
Somehow I have got to convey the meaning of moral
decisions and their relations to significant outcomes.
Most important, I want to point out that single acts of
individuals and strong stands of institutions at an
early date do make a difference in the long run.
This is my next assignment. Now I'm through
teaching no-fault history.
L
Copyright 0
permission.
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WIHERE THE WORLD IS
(Continuedfrom page 51)
for an operational as well as cognitive exploration of
basic lawyer skills and professional roles, requires a
more talented and innovative teacher than the more
structured and familiar case-class teaching.
These principles have several implications for the
design of a clinical program.
First, clinical experiences should come very early in
the law school experience and be fully integrated with
the remainder of the curriculum.
Second, while certain clinical experiences should be
required of all students, a variety of clinical opportunities should be available to advanced students on
an elective basis, just as advanced seminars now provide an in-depth exposure to particular subject areas.
Third, the clinical programs should be supervised
by a small number of regular faculty, equal to the rest

of the faculty in intellectual distinction but oriented
toward this more innovative learning environment,
and also by a larger group of recent graduates who
would serve as full-time supervising attorneys or
interns.
Clinical legal education, as discussed here, is not
limited to participation in an attorney-client relationship (which usually means providing legal services to
indigents). That is an important aspect and should be
included; but a good clinical program would employ
simulation, role playing, games, elaborate written or
taped "case records" and a variety of other instructional techniques.
It should also be a multitrack system offering advanced law students a number of options: (1) civil
legal aid, (2) criminal defense experiences, (3) criminal prosecution experiences, (4) provision of legal
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services for special groups such as prisoners, (5) legislative or administrative work for government agencies, and, it is to be hoped, (6) arrangements for participation in counseling corporate and other paying
clients.
If a clinical program is well designed to achieve
educational objectives, and staffed at a level that
permits effective supervision and imaginative teaching, it deserves a substantial allotment of academic
credit. I expect it will not be too many years before
students are required to have a minimum exposure
to clinical experiences of various kinds, probably
beginning in the first year of law school and continuing in subsequent years.
REGULATION OF COURSE REQUIREMENTS
The relationship of law schools to the profession is an
element in the recent discussion of professional certification of specialties and professional training for
admission to the bar. As legal practice has become
more intricate and specialized, devices to encourage
lawyers to obtain advanced training and to assist the
public in selecting competent representatives have
been suggested.
For the most part the proposals take the form of
certification arrangements that allow qualifying attorneys to represent to the public that they are certified in a particular specialty. Bar groups would rely
on experience, tests, or advanced training in certifying
specialists. Other lawyers would not be excluded from
performing specialized legal work but could not represent themselves as certified.
The complexities of modern legal practice may
require this development, but it is ironic that the areas
generally mentioned (tax, labor, securities, etc.) are
well defined ones in which clients tend to be sophisticated and knowledgeable.
Lawyers who have practiced in a field usually are
not required to meet the same standards as newer
entrants, a factor suggesting that preference for incumbents may be a danger to be guarded against as
the certification movement grows.
Certification programs that depend in whole or in
part on completion of required course work offer both
a challenge and an opportunity to law schools. As in
continuing legal education, the pedagogical experience of law teachers is likely to be especially useful if
high-quality programs are to result.

A related issue, much discussed during the last
year, involves bar admission requirements that are
framed in terms of particular course offerings. While
law schools recognize that some courses are more essential than others, they resist proposals that would
require courses of specific content or length.
The opposition of law teachers to such proposals
combines practical objections with pure principle.
Specification of required courses involves a species of
labeling in which course content may or may not
reflect the label.
To the extent that content is specified, the law curriculum becomes inflexible and experimentation or
change is blocked. Because of the national market for
employment of recent law graduates, the requirements of a few major states can have a restrictive
effect on legal education everywhere.
In addition to these practical objections, which rest
on the wisdom or flexibility of particular requirements, the law schools feel that control of legal education should be left to them, working in concert with
national accrediting organizations such as the American Bar Association and the Association of American
Law Schools. Minimum national requirements
framed in general terms leave more room for educational experimentation and progress than a multiplicity of state and local requirements.
These general views are in opposition to the tentative proposal of the Committee on Qualifications
to Practice before the United States District Courts
in the Second Circuit, chaired by Robert L. Clare,
Esq., of New York City.
A more constructive approach, in my view, would
be encouragement by the judiciary of clinical programs for law students. Relaxation of existing requirements that curtail such opportunities for law students,
working under proper supervision, to get trial experience in the courts offers more promise for improvement than insistence on any rigid prescription of
courses. Fortunately, the rules now adopted by the
Judicial Conference for the Second Circuit have
moved in this direction.
We can agree that clinical education and broadened professional training in trial advocacy are desirable. But it is one thing to offer a course and another
to require most or all students to take it. Insisting
upon a subject sometimes places a curse on it and also
may affect quality by resulting in overlarge classes, or
increase cost by requiring many separate sections. IL
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